The IAEA’s latest report on Iran

29May08

IAEA to Iran: “When did you stop beating your wife?”

The United States provided a number of restricted and classified intelligence records to the IAEA in February and March 2008, some of which could not be shown to Iranian officials.  Some of these records pertained to military procurement of possible nuclear-related equipment, the “green salt” project (a uranium conversion technology), high explosives testing and research into a missile re-entry vehicle.

In February, Iran had declined to respond to some of these issues due to lack of time.  During a meeting in Tehran on 21–22 April 2008, Iran agreed to address the alleged studies, the procurement and research activities of military related institutes and companies, and questions raised by the IAEA earlier in the year.  Iran provided a written response to the agency’s question on 23 May 2008.

The IAEA was clearly dissatisfied with Iran’s responses.  Iran claimed some of  the documents were forgeries or manipulated, contained inconsistencies or otherwise referred to matters in the public domain.  Its work on high-speed detonators was identified as for civilian or conventional military application.  Although the IAEA confirmed that it had no information no information, apart from a document on uranium metal document, on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies.

The IAEA concluded:

The alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project remain a matter of serious concern. Clarification of these is critical to an assessment of the nature of Iran’s past and present nuclear programme. Iran has agreed to address the alleged studies. However, it maintains that all the allegations are baseless and that the data have been fabricated.

The Agency’s overall assessment of the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme also requires, inter alia, an understanding of the role of the uranium metal document, and clarifications by Iran concerning some procurement activities of military related institutions, which remain outstanding. Substantive explanations are required from Iran to support its statements on the alleged studies and on other information with a possible military dimension. Iran’s responses to the Agency’s letter of 9 May 2008 were not received until 23 May 2008 and could not yet be assessed by the Agency. It is essential that Iran provide all requested information, clarifications and access outlined in this report without further  delay.  It should be emphasized, however, that the that the Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies.[iv]Some matters had not changed:  all of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities were mostly open to the IAEA and verified, and the IAEA could certify there had been no diversion of enriched uranium that remained at LEU levels (4%).   Obviously, Iran continued to defy the three outstanding Security Council resolutions demanding that it cease uranium enrichment.    

 

 

 

The din of the Western press drowned out any positive aspects of the May 2008 IAEA report.[v]  Most American and European observers concluded that the report confirmed Iran’s ill intentions to proceed with a military nuclear program.   Even skeptics of American overstatements were taken aback:

 “The Iranians are certainly being confronted with some pretty strong evidence of a nuclear weapons program, and they are being petulant and defensive,” said David Albright, a former weapons inspector who now runs the Institute for Science and International Security. “The report lays out what the agency knows, and it is very damning. I’ve never seen it laid out quite like this.”[vi] 

The IAEA report, like its predecessors, emphasized that the agency was troubled not so much by the hard data but the general impression that Iranian officials were not being cooperative, and hence, were hiding something.  All of the nuclear materials are accounted for, but this is apparently no longer sufficient.  Iran’s protestations that it is subject to a double standard are no longer sufficient to satisfy the inspectors, or ward off further sanctions or worse.

Iran also was displeased with the report.  Within days of the IAEA’s release of the document, newly-appointed parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani condemned the report as a ‘deception’ and accused the IAEA of being ‘ambiguous’ about Iran’s progress.  (Significantly, Larjani had been the chief nuclear negotiator for Iran between 2002 and 2007).   He remarked, “A mysterious diplomatic give-and-take is underway between US and the UN nuclear agency to bring baseless allegations against Iran.”[vii]   Larijani intimated that Iranian cooperation may suffer as a consequence of the ‘deplorable’ report, which if followed through will return the nuclear standoff to a position worse than when it began in 2002.

 

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[i]    IAEA, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 26 May 2008, GOV/2008/15, at  http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEA_Iran_Report_26May2008.pdf.  A copy is included with Appendix B.

[v]      “UN watchdog says Iran hiding weapons studies, “ Agence France Presse, 27 May 2008, http://www.axilltv.com/at/news.php?id=8637 , “Iran nuclear crisis refuses to go quiet,” BBC News, 27 May 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7421262.stm 

 [vi]   “Atomic monitor signals concern over Iran’s work,” New York Times, 27 May 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/27/world/middleeast/27iran.html?em&ex=1212033600&en=3cf74493ed3f24d8&ei=5087%0A

 [vii]   “Larijani critical of US meddling with Iran IAEA cooperation,”  Islamic Republic News Agency, 28 May 2008, http://www2.irna.com/en/news/view/line-22/0805286367152937.htm

 

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